一种基于SGX的轻量Fabric链码可信执行环境构建方法

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1671-1122.2022.07.009

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

Hyperledger Fabric是一个开源分布式账本平台,其不仅拥有公有链防篡改、分布式记账的特点,还具有身份识别、数据保密、低延迟、高吞吐率等优点。传统Fabric架构中的链码缺乏安全执行环境,其容器执行环境会带来隐私泄露风险,而现有的智能合约隐私保护方案无法适用于Go语言链码架构,且性能开销较大。因此,文章提出一种基于SGX的轻量Fabric链码可信执行环境构建方法及E-Fabric架构,搭建支持原生Go语言的可信镜像和容器,为链码创建可信执行环境,并通过远程认证协议验证链码是否可信。理论评估和数据测试结果表明,SGX Enclave的构建会适当增加开销,与原Fabric架构相比,E-Fabric的延迟升高了8%左右,吞吐率下降了4%左右,但整体性能达到原网络的94%,并且具有较小的可信计算基和更好的安全性。

关键词: 区块链, Hyperledger Fabric, 链码, 可信执行环境, Intel SGX

Abstract:

Hyperledger Fabric is an open source distributed ledger platform, which not only takes advantage of the tamper-proof and distributed accounting features of the public chain, but also incorporates advantages such as identity recognition, data confidentiality, low latency and high throughput. The chaincode in the traditional Fabric architecture lacks a secure execution environment, and its container operating environment will bring the risk of privacy leakage. And the existing smart contract privacy protection scheme cannot be applied to the Go language chaincode architecture, and there are defects such as high performance overhead. Therefore, a method and framework were proposed for constructing a lightweight trusted execution environment for Fabric chaincode based on SGX-called E-Fabric, which built trusted images and containers that supported native Go language, created trusted execution environment for chaincode, and verified whether the chaincode was trusted through the remote attestation protocol. Theoretical evaluations and experimental tests show that the creating of the SGX Enclave will increase the overhead. Compared with the original Fabric network, the E-Fabric’s latency increases by about 8%, the throughput decreases by about 4%, and the overall performance can reach 94% of the original Fabric network. At the same time, E-Fabric has a small trusted computing base and stronger security.

Key words: blockchain, Hyperledger Fabric, chaincode, trusted execution environment, Intel SGX

中图分类号:

TP309

KELEKET GOMA Christy Junior Yannick, 易文哲, 王鹃. 一种基于SGX的轻量Fabric链码可信执行环境构建方法[J]. 信息网络安全, 2022, 22(7): 73-83.

KELEKET GOMA Christy Junior Yannick, YI Wenzhe, WANG Juan. A Lightweight Trusted Execution Environment Construction Method for Fabric Chaincode Based on SGX[J]. Netinfo Security, 2022, 22(7): 73-83.

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镜像名称	父镜像	基本功能
fabric-peer	alpine:3.10	peer节点镜像,安装peer相关文件,用于生成peer运行容器
fabric-orderer	alpine:3.10	排序节点镜像,安装orderer相关文件,用于生成orderer运行容器
efabric/base	ubuntu:20.04	E-Fabric可信基础镜像,作为链码编译、运行的父镜像
ego-baseos	efabric/base:0.1	Go链码可信运行镜像,用于生成链码运行容器
ego-ccenv	efabric/base:0.1	Go链码可信编译镜像,在链码实例化过程中作为默认编译环境将链码编译为二进制文件

API名称	功能
func AskAttestation(chaincodeAddr string)(Report, error)	向指定地址的链码发送认证请求
func SendAttestation(peerAddr string, Report struct)(error)	将身份认证报告发送给指定地址peer节点
func VerifyAttestation(IASAddr string, Report struct)(Result,error)	peer节点向IAS中心发送验证请求
func EncryptOperation(operation struct, key string)(enOperation,error)	加密操作指令（Invoke或Query）
func DecryptOperation(enOperation struct, key string)(deOperation,error)	解密操作指令
func SignResult(result struct, key string)(siResult,error)	签名操作指令

区块链名称	Enclave数量/个	可信代码数量/行	性能
FPC	2	5000~10000	原Fabric的90%
E-Fabric	1	200~5000	原Fabric的94%