Key Management Scheme for IoT Based on Blockchain Technology

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1671-1122.2020.08.001

Abstract

Abstract:

A blockchain key distribution scheme for the Internet of things is proposed. First, the quantum random number generator is used to continuously generate random numbers, which are securely stored on the cloud storage. Second, the initiator selects a reasonable random number length according to the security requirements of different services and pays the corresponding bill to the proxy server. Third, the proxy server uploads purchasing records to the blockchain node for verifications and broadcast to the entire network. After the initiator’s gateway successfully queries the transaction records on the blockchain according to the transaction hash value, the interface devices of random numbers authenticate the identities of the gateways of the initiator and the sharer. Then, the random number stream is automatically stored in the smart card by smart contracts. Finally, the initiator and the sharer gain the corresponding smart card to get the shared key, respectively. The proposed scheme can effectively distribute the keys in IoTs so that it can realize secure communications between sensor devices in different subnets of IoTs.

Key words: blockchain, IoT, quantum random number, key distribution

CLC Number:

TP309

SHI Runhua, SHI Ze. Key Management Scheme for IoT Based on Blockchain Technology[J]. Netinfo Security, 2020, 20(8): 1-8.

Figures/Tables 10

References 24

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符号	解释
G	物联网子网网关
G_i	第i个物联网子网网关
S	代理服务器
S_t	第t个代理服务器
ID	网关的唯一标识
ID_i	网关i的唯一标识
key	共享密钥
key_ij	网关i与j之间的共享密钥
Ran	随机数
ACC	网关账户
ACC_i	网关i的账户

曲线	siglen	sign	sign/s	verify	verify/s
NIST192p	48	0.00051 s	1958.15	0.00096 s	1043.69
NIST224p	56	0.00063 s	1592.33	0.00112 s	889.21
NIST256p	64	0.00080 s	1256.33	0.00148 s	675.38
NIST384p	96	0.00166 s	603.27	0.00378 s	264.74
NIST521p	132	0.00370 s	270.07	0.00589 s	169.65
SECP256k1	64	0.00078 s	1285.33	0.00145 s	692.02
BRAINPOOLP160r1	40	0.00039 s	2541.60	0.00064 s	1559.46
BRAINPOOLP192r1	48	0.00049 s	2034.21	0.00090 s	1116.00
BRAINPOOLP224r1	56	0.00064 s	1561.74	0.00104 s	964.17
BRAINPOOLP256r1	64	0.00079 s	1271.84	0.00146 s	684.67
BRAINPOOLP320r1	80	0.00108 s	927.34	0.00200 s	498.99
BRAINPOOLP384r1	96	0.00163 s	613.03	0.00297 s	336.76
BRAINPOOLP512r1	128	0.00338 s	295.45	0.00588 s	170.02