False Data Intrusion Detection Method Based on Physical Information in Power Network

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1671-1122.2019.04.004

Abstract

Abstract: Aim

ing at the difficulty of fast detection in false data intrusion detection method, this paper proposes a false data intrusion detection method based on physical information. The method uses the high-sampling synchronous phasor measurement unit to collect measurement data in real time, and calculates the node voltage stability index (NVSI). When abnormal NVSI values exist in grid nodes, the system is based on the outlier detection algorithm to find the attacked nodes. When there are no obvious abnormal NVSI values in grid nodes, the vulnerable nodes are selected according to the difference of the NVSI value in time, and the attacked nodes are detected by physical rules cooperative detection method for the selected nodes. This paper uses a standard IEEE 39-bus power test system to simulate the system. The results show that the proposed method can detect the attacked nodes faster than other methods, and improve the detection accuracy.

Key words: false data injection, synchronous phasor measurement, vulnerable nodes, physical rules

CLC Number:

TP309

Zhuoqun XIA, Youyou ZENG, Bo YIN, Ming XU. False Data Intrusion Detection Method Based on Physical Information in Power Network[J]. Netinfo Security, 2019, 19(4): 29-36.

Figures/Tables 7

References 17

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（1）断1条线路			（2）断2条线路			（3）断3条线路
LOF	节点编号	NVSI	LOF	节点编号	NVSI	LOF	节点编号	NVSI
40.713	14	1.183	44.852	14	1.377	41.843	14	1.380
30.447	4	0.894	28.676	16	0.896	34.340	25	1.141
1.921	39	0.082	25.017	4	0.788	27.344	16	0.918
1.607	12	0.074	20.199	17	0.645	23.213	4	0.787
1.552	29	0.072	1.876	39	0.079	19.913	26	0.679
1.529	8	0.071	1.790	8	0.077	18.215	17	0.625
1.284	20	0.065	1.748	12	0.075	1.609	39	0.079
1.27	5	-0.007	1.652	29	0.072	1.556	3	-0.006