基于动态密钥的智能电网无线通信数据加密传输方案

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1671-1122.2019.12.002

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

文章针对智能电网SCADA系统无线通信的特点,设计了基于动态密钥的数据加密方案。其中动态密钥生成算法是对SAXENA等人提出动态密钥生成方案的改进,通过监听应用层数据的发送情况以及设置动态密钥的产生频率控制共享密钥的更新频率;在数据通信过程中,将附加传输的随机数序列的哈希值作为动态密钥,进一步更新共享密钥;利用CTR模式进行数据加解密,同时采用对称密码算法和异或运算降低通信开销。实验表明,该方案可以抵抗长时间窃听攻击、恶意注入攻击、重放攻击等多种安全攻击。文章还对方案进行了正确性和代价性分析,同时解决了密钥同步性问题和普适性问题,进一步确保了系统的安全性和自愈性。

关键词: 智能电网, 无线通信, SCADA, 动态密钥, 共享密钥

Abstract:

Aiming at the characteristics of wireless communication in smart grid SCADA system, this paper designed a data encryption scheme based on dynamic key. The dynamic key generation algorithm is an improvement of the dynamic key generation scheme proposed by SAXENA et al. The purpose of controlling the update frequency of the shared key is finally realized by monitoring the transmission of the application layer data and setting the frequency of generating the dynamic key. In the communication process, the Hash value of the additional transmitted random number sequence is used as the dynamic key to further update the shared key. The CTR mode is used for data encryption and decryption, and the symmetric cryptographic algorithm and the exclusive OR operation are used to reduce the communication overhead of the scheme. Experiments show that this scheme can resist multiple security attacks such as long-term eavesdropping attacks, malicious injection attacks, and replay attacks, and analyzes them correctly and costly. At the same time, it solved the problem of pre-existing key synchronization and universality to ensure the security and self-healing of the system.

Key words: smart grid, wireless communication, SCADA, dynamic key, shared key

中图分类号:

TP309

黎妹红, 齐小晨, 吴倩倩. 基于动态密钥的智能电网无线通信数据加密传输方案[J]. 信息网络安全, 2019, 19(12): 10-21.

Meihong LI, Xiaochen QI, Qianqian WU. Smart Grid Wireless Communication Data Encryption Transmission Scheme Based on Dynamic Key[J]. Netinfo Security, 2019, 19(12): 10-21.

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参数	描述
F()	数据加解密函数
SN	主站设备
CN	从站设备
DS	动态密钥
SK	共享密钥
CT	密文
PT	明文,通常指测量值等信息
id_cn	从站设备标识符
Str	主站设备和从站设备的安全共享初始值
h()	单向哈希函数
E()	对称密码算法

组号	均值	标准差
1	1969819471.69	1239435578.882
2	2047920003.68	1329678041.0091
3	2187216598.44	1273763704.0216
4	2105560471.31	1139708764.0567
5	2139772842.11	1211137659.5703
6	2029205991.4	1236946250.1248
7	1890509205.75	1222092447.2377
8	2038292762.02	1332333892.945
9	2192560510.94	1279633148.2906
10	2104964707.38	1189347360.2849

请求次数	重传请求次数	N= 4		N=8		N=16		N=32
请求次数	重传请求次数	理论	实际	理论	实际	理论	实际	理论	实际
10000	623	2344	2344	1172	1172	586	586	293	293
20000	1312	4672	4672	2336	2336	1168	1168	584	584
30000	1944	7014	7014	3507	3507	1753	1753	876	876
40000	2704	9324	9324	4662	4662	2331	2331	1165	1165
50000	3265	11684	11684	5842	5842	2921	2921	1461	1461
60000	3756	14061	14061	7030	7030	3515	3515	1757	1757
70000	4382	16404	16404	8202	8202	4101	4101	2050	2050
80000	5032	18742	18742	9371	9371	4685	4685	2342	2342
90000	5787	21053	21053	10526	10526	5263	5263	2631	2631
100000	6570	23357	23357	11678	11678	5839	5839	2919	2919

比较项目	本文方案	LIU^[14]等人方案	SAXENA^[5]等人方案
监听对象	应用层数据	数据链路层	数据链路层
适用通信协议	NDP3、Modbus	Modbus	NDP3
密钥更新周期	N	阈值Ψ	每次通信
是否存在弱密钥	否	是	否
是否依赖于网络环境	否	是	是
抵抗中间人攻击	√	√	√
抵抗选择明文攻击	√	×	√
前向安全性	√	×	√
抵抗重放攻击	√	√	√
抵抗窃听攻击	√	√	√
算法	AES、XOR、SHA256	AES、MD2、XOR	DES、XOR、SHA128

	本文方案
	CN	SN
动态密钥	4T_SE+T_h	4T_SD+T_h
数据加密	5T_XOR+4T_hmac	5T_XOR+4T_hmac
总开销	4T_SE+T_h+5T_XOR+4T_hmac	4T_SD+T_h+5T_XOR+4T_hmac
更新次数	1	1
	文献[5]
	CN	SN
动态密钥	4T_SE+nT_parse+4T_h	4T_SD+nT_parse+4T_h
数据加密	4T_XOR	4T_XOR
总开销	4T_SE+nT_parse+4T_h+4T_XOR	4T_SD+nT_parse+4T_h+4T_XOR
更新次数	4	4
	文献[13]
	CN	SN
动态密钥	4T_SE+nT_parse+T_h	4T_SD+nT_parse+T_h
数据加密	4T_XOR	4T_XOR
总开销	4T_SE+nT_parse₊+T_h+4T_XOR	4T_SD+nT_parse+T_h+4T_XOR
更新次数	1	1