信息网络安全 ›› 2025, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (5): 758-766.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1671-1122.2025.05.008

• 理论研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于重映射矩阵的Rowhammer漏洞防御方法研究

王建新1, 许弘可1,2(), 肖超恩1, 张磊1   

  1. 1.北京电子科技学院,北京 100070
    2.建德市密码管理局,杭州 311699
  • 收稿日期:2024-10-18 出版日期:2025-05-10 发布日期:2025-06-10
  • 通讯作者: 许弘可 201720060827@ecut.edu.cn
  • 作者简介:王建新(1977—),男,教授,博士,主要研究方向为电子信息工程、EDA技术、信息安全|许弘可(1999—),男,硕士研究生,CCF会员,主要研究方向为电子信息工程、形式化语义、信息安全|肖超恩(1982—),男,讲师,博士,主要研究方向为嵌入式系统安全、智能软件和分布式计算|张磊(1979—),男,教授,博士,主要研究方向为密码工程、芯片安全、网络空间安全
  • 基金资助:
    中央高校基本科研业务费(3282024009);中央高校基本科研业务费(20230051Z0114);中央高校基本科研业务费(20230050Z0114);院级特色教材讲义项目(20220119Z0221);教育部产学合作协同育人项目(20220163H0211);北京高等教育“本科教学改革创新项目”(20220121Z0208);北京高等教育“本科教学改革创新项目”(202110018002);学院教学类孵化项目(20220120Z0220);学院学科建设项目(20230007Z0452);学院学科建设项目(20230010Z0452)

Research on Rowhammer Vulnerability Defense Method Based on Remapping Matrix

WANG Jianxin1, XU Hongke1,2(), XIAO Chaoen1, ZHANG Lei1   

  1. 1. Beijing Electronic Science and Technology Institute, Beijing 100070, China
    2. Jiande City Cryptography Bureau, Hangzhou 311699, China
  • Received:2024-10-18 Online:2025-05-10 Published:2025-06-10

摘要:

针对国产高级精简指令集(ARM)架构计算机中动态随机存取内存(DRAM)存在Rowhammer漏洞的问题,文章首先介绍了重映射矩阵,并结合重映射矩阵分析了Rowhammer漏洞产生原因;然后,提出一种基于重映射矩阵的Rowhammer漏洞防御方法,该方法通过物理地址重映射和禁用pagemap接口相结合的方法防御Rowhammer攻击;最后通过改变DRAM中行解码器和列选择器实现重映射矩阵,并在国产ARM架构计算机平台和Xilinx Zynq 7000系列芯片上对该方法进行功能测试,同时通过搭建Vivado集成开发环境对该方法进行安全性分析和性能分析。功能测试结果表明,该方法能够有效抵御Rowhammer攻击。安全性分析结果表明,与未采取防御措施相比,Rowhammer漏洞发生率下降了98.6%。性能分析结果表明,引入该防御方法后得到的解码器延迟为0.783 ns,资源占用率约为0.002%,延迟和资源占用率极低,对国产ARM架构计算机的性能影响微乎其微。

关键词: Rowhammer漏洞, 国产ARM架构计算机, DRAM, 重映射矩阵

Abstract:

Aiming at the problem of Rowhammer vulnerability in dynamic random access memory (DRAM) of domestic Advanced RISC Machines (ARM) architecture computers, this paper firstly introduced the remapping matrix, and analyzed the causes of Rowhammer vulnerability based on the remapping matrix. Secondly, a Rowhammer vulnerability defense method based on remapping matrix was proposed, which combined physical address remapping with disabling pagemap interface to defend against Rowhammer attacks. Finally, the remapping matrix was realized by changing the DRAM line decoder and column selectors, and the Rowhammer vulnerability defense method was tested on the domestic ARM architecture computers and Xilinx Zynq7000 series. At the same time, the security and performance of this method were analyzed by setting up Vivado integrated development environment. The functional test results show that the Rowhammer vulnerability defense method can effectively resist the Rowhammer attack. The security analysis results show that compared to not taking defensive measures, the occurrence rate of Rowhammer vulnerability decreased by 98.6%. The performance analysis results show that the decoder obtained after the introduction of this defense method has a latency of 0.783ns and a resource occupancy of about 0.002%, which is extremely low, and has little impact on the performance of domestic ARM architecture computers.

Key words: Rowhammer vulnerability, domestic ARM architecture computers, DRAM, remapping matrix

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