信息网络安全

信息网络安全 ›› 2025, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (11): 1792-1810.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1671-1122.2025.11.011

• 专题论文：机密计算 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于机密计算平台的TEE和TPM硬件可信信道构建方案

金娃1,2, 秦宇1(), 刘菁润2, 尚科彤1, 贾梦涵1,2, 林江南1   

  1. 1.中国科学院软件研究所可信计算与信息保障实验室， 北京 100190
    2.中国科学院大学， 北京 100049
  • 收稿日期:2025-07-08 出版日期:2025-11-10 发布日期:2025-12-02
  • 通讯作者: 秦宇 qinyu@iscas.ac.cn
  • 作者简介:金娃（2001—），女，内蒙古，硕士研究生，主要研究方向为可信计算、机密计算|秦宇（1979—），男，重庆，正高级工程师，博士，主要研究方向为可信计算、机密计算|刘菁润（2000—），男，河南，硕士研究生，主要研究方向为可信计算、机密计算|尚科彤（1997—），女，内蒙古，助理工程师，硕士，主要研究方向为可信计算、机密计算|贾梦涵（2002—），女，山东，硕士研究生，主要研究方向为可信计算、机密计算|林江南（1996—），男，福建，助理工程师，硕士，主要研究方向为可信计算、机密计算
  • 基金资助:
    国家重点研发计划(2024YFE0211100)

A Hardware Trusted Channel Construction Scheme Based on TEE and TPM for Confidential Computing Platforms

JIN Wa1,2, QIN Yu1(), LIU Jingrun2, SHANG Ketong1, JIA Menghan1,2, LIN Jiangnan1   

  1. 1. Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
    2. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China
  • Received:2025-07-08 Online:2025-11-10 Published:2025-12-02

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摘要：

近年来，机密计算在保护用户隐私和数据安全方面发挥着越来越重要的作用。随着基于海量AI数据的机密计算平台应用需求增加，机密计算平台的可信信道构建和机密互联成为热点研究方向之一。针对机密计算平台的证明、数据可信传输和存储的安全需求，文章提出一种基于硬件密钥协商机制的可信执行环境（TEE）和可信平台模块（TPM）硬件的可信信道构建方案。该方案主要由3个安全通信协议构成。在子系统相互证明协议中，使用可信第三方为可信计算平台节点的子系统颁发可验证的证明令牌，实现基于多异构硬件信任根场景的统一证明。在硬件TEE和TPM密钥协商协议中，协商过程兼容于现有TEE技术规范和TPM密钥协商接口，并派生密钥保护传输中的机密数据。相较于应用软件通信，基于设备硬件建立的可信通信信道具备更高的安全性。在TEE密钥/秘密数据供给协议中，TPM将密钥/秘密数据通过可信信道供给TEE安全应用，提升TEE中数据存储保护的安全性。由安全性分析评估可得，文章方案能够有效防御攻击者对系统的伪造、欺骗、篡改等攻击。实现的原型系统实验评估结果表明，相较于传统虚拟机，TEE和TPM硬件密钥协商延时仅增加2%，基于文章方案密钥协商和持续传输数据的TEE运行时系统总体性能损失小于0.7%。综上所述，文章方案在提升机密计算平台通信安全性的同时，对系统运行和通信性能影响较小，具备良好的实用性与可扩展性。

关键词: 可信执行环境, 可信平台模块, 可信信道, 密钥协商

Abstract:

In recent years, confidential computing has played an increasingly important role in safeguarding user privacy and data security. With the growing demand for confidential computing platforms that handle massive AI workloads, establishing trusted channels and confidential interconnections has become a critical research issue. This paper proposed a trusted channel construction scheme based on trusted execution environments (TEE) and trusted platform modules (TPM), leveraging a hardware-based key exchange mechanism to meet the security requirements of attestation, trusted data transmission, and secure storage on confidential computing platforms. The proposed scheme consisted of three protocols. First, in the subsystem mutual attestation protocol, a trusted third party issued verifiable attestation tokens to the subsystems within a trusted computing platform node, enabling unified attestation in a heterogeneous hardware root-of-trust environment. Second, the TEE and TPM based hardware key exchange protocol ensured compatibility with existing TEE specifications and TPM key exchange interfaces and derived encryption keys to protect confidential data during transmission. Compared to application-layer communication, the use of hardware-based trusted channels significantly enhanced communication security. Third, the TEE key/secret data provisioning protocol enabled the TPM to securely provide keys or secret data to TEE applications over the established trusted channel, improving the protection of sensitive data stored within the TEE. Security analysis demonstrated that the proposed scheme effectively defends against common attacks such as forgery, spoofing, and tampering. Prototype system evaluations show that the TEE and TPM based hardware key exchange introduces only a 2% increase in latency compared to traditional virtual machines. Furthermore, the overall performance overhead for key exchange and sustained data transmission in the TEE runtime system is less than 0.7%. In summary, the proposed scheme enhances the communication security of confidential computing platforms with minimal impact on runtime and communication performance.

Key words: TEE, TPM, trusted channel, key exchange

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